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This study tests FDI technology spillover models with the assumption that learning takes time 
against wage bargaining models by estimating the wage-premium of a foreign takeover. The 
technology spillover theory predicts a larger wage growth in firms taken over by foreign 
investors than in local firms. However, this wage growth should be confined to high-skilled 
workers or workers with a high level of education. Wage bargaining models also predict such 
a wage growth. But it should be confined to workers who are organized in trade unions, i.e. 
workers with low or medium level of education or skill. We apply Hungarian employee-
employer matched data from 1992 until 2001, and reject the FDI technology spillover model 
in favor of the wage bargaining model when differentiating the wage premium by education 
or occupation, both by applying Mincer wage regressions and the nearest-neighbor matching 
method. 
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1 Introduction 
 
International technology transfer has been viewed as a major channel through which less 
developed countries catch up to the rich (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). More recently, 
industrial countries become aware that technology transfer – whether legal or not - in the 
sectors of their comparative advantage may actually deteriorate their welfare (Samuelson, 
2004). Whether viewed as a curse or blessing, investigating existence and extent of 
international technology transfer is of interest to both sides. 
 
One channel of technology transfer is foreign direct investment (FDI). According to theory, 
workers learn a superior technology in foreign affiliates and transmit this knowledge to local 
competitors through worker turnover or spin-offs. Since it is impossible to directly measure 
knowledge transmission embodied in workers, theory provides an indirect measure: 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) are willing to pay an extra amount of wages to discourage 
worker turnover and prevent thereby leakage of superior technology to local competitors. The 
wage premium measures then the economic value of the local competitor’s productivity gain 
from potential technology-spillover effects (Fosfuri et al., 2001, Glass and Saggi, 2002).
2 
 
Recent extensions have specified this insight: Malchow-Møller et al. (2007) and Urban (2007) 
argue that learning foreign technology takes time. Then MNEs can offer contracts where 
higher wages are paid by the MNE than by indigenous firms after learning and lower wages 
before. Hence, econometric estimates need to take the wage-premium time-profile into 
account to avoid inconsistent estimates. Some evidence for faster wage growth of workers in 
foreign affiliates compared to local firms is found in Malchow-Møller et al. (2007) for 
                                                 
2 An alternative investigation estimates the productivity of local firms in dependence of their share of workers 
with MNE experience. See Görg and Strobl (2005) for Ghana and Balsvik (2006) for Norway.   3
Denmark. Moreover, Csengödi et al. (2008) find that the wage premium rises over time after a 
takeover took place in Hungary.
3 
 
However, there is an alternative explanation for this time profile. Görg et al. (2007) develops 
a bargaining model where a rising wage premium is explained without the threat of a 
technology transfer from foreign affiliates to local firms. Because of their bargaining power, 
workers simply get a share of the rents that result from the faster productivity growth of the 
foreign affiliate. 
 
The purpose of our paper is to test technology spillover models against such a bargaining 
model to exclude that the wage premium profile is caused by factors other than a potential 
technology transfer. We discriminate the two models by the prediction that the wage premium 
should materialize among high-skilled or well-educated workers if the technology spillover is 
the explanation for the wage premium, because they have the largest absorptive capacity for 
new technology. Instead, the wage premium should materialize among low- and medium-
skilled or less-educated workers if the bargaining model is the explanation, because rent 
sharing is the more likely the better organized a group of workers is. However, less-skilled 
workers are typically better organized while high-skilled workers fear to undermine future 
promotion opportunities when threatening the management with a strike, for example. 
 
To pursue this test, we resort to the natural experiment of a foreign takeover. The further is 
the takeover event in the past the more time have (tenured) workers had to experience the 
foreign technology. Hence, we estimate monthly gross wages of employees during the last ten 
years in Hungary, investigate the wage premium by the number of years before and after a 
foreign takeover, and differentiate this wage premium further by either education or (broad) 
occupation groups. Methodologically, we follow Brown et al. (2006a, 2006b) by applying the 
                                                 
3 In a similar fashion Møen (2005) finds on Norway that technical staff in R&D intensive firms pay for the 
knowledge they accumulate on the job through lower wages early in their career.   4
preprogram test of Heckman and Hotz (1989) to control for self-selection effects. And we 
follow Girma and Görg (2007) and Csengödi et al. (2008) by applying the nearest-neighbor 
matching method of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to establish causality. 
 
Our main result is that the foreign-firm wage premium grows over the years after a foreign 
takeover only of workers with low or medium levels of education and for blue-collar and 
white-collar low-skilled workers but not for workers with a high level of education or white-
collar high-skilled workers. Hence, we reject the FDI technology spillover model in favor of 
the wage bargaining model on Hungarian data. 
 
Our paper relates directly to similar estimations of the wage premium of foreign takeovers 
differentiated by skill or education. Görg and Girma (2007) shows for the UK that US 
affiliates pay a significant wage premium directly after takeover for high skilled workers, but 
the wage premium emerges only two years after takeover for unskilled workers. Results on 
Portugal are ambiguous: while Almeida (2007) presents a significant and positive 2% wage 
premium for low-educated and a 4% premium for higher educated workers of firms that have 
been taken over by foreign investors, Martins (2004) reports an insignificant wage premium. 
Heyman et al. (2006) finds a wage premium for top managers but not for other employees in 
Sweden. Moreover, this positive wage premium emerges not only after foreign acquisition but 
after any acquisition. Pesola (2006) finds for Finland that local firms compensate the years of 
experience at a foreign affiliate only of workers with university degree. Instead, Andrews et 
al. (2007) does not find that foreign-owned firms appear to reward more highly-skilled 
occupations or more highly qualified individuals, applying difference-in-difference methods 
to German employee-employer matched data. 
 
The difference in the results is likely to be due to the choice of country in the analysis. 
Hungary is an interesting country to investigate FDI technology spillover effects because of   5
three reasons: First, Hungary was first completely isolated from Western technology and 
suddenly opened up to foreign investors by large-scale privatization and FDI liberalization. 
Second, the Hungarian workforce is relatively educated such that there is a large absorptive 
capacity for foreign technology. Third, Hungary has a firm-based collective bargaining 
system. Hence, the environment is fertile to firm-level rent-sharing and technology spillovers. 
This is in contrast to studies of Martins (2004) and Almeida (2007) on Portugal, Heyman et 
al. (2006) on Sweden, Pesola (2006) on Finland, and Andrews et al. (2007) on Germany, 
where wages are much more inflexible or the scope for technology spillovers limited. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a short overview of the 
existing theory on the foreign wage premium and derives our empirical hypotheses; section 3 
describes our estimation equation; section 4 describes the data and the construction of a full 





The theoretical literature addressing foreign-firm wage premia offers several potential 
explanations for the observation that foreign firms pay higher wages than domestically-owned 
ones for the same type of worker. 
 
One type of model considers the wage premium as a means to hinder, or reduce knowledge 
spillovers. Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002) assume foreign-owned firms to 
have a technology superior to domestically-owned firms. Workers of foreign-owned firms 
might spill over the superior knowledge to local competitors when they transit, thereby 
reducing the competitive edge of the foreign-owned firm. Wage premia give a disincentive to 
worker mobility and therefore reduce the knowledge spillover occurring from worker   6
turnover. However, if learning from foreign technology takes time rather than occurs instantly 
(Malchow-Møller et al., 2006; Urban, 2007), foreign-owned firms will pay lower wages 
before and higher after the appropriation of its technology. Overall, expected life-time income 
of an employee must be equal irrespective of being employed in a foreign-owned or a 
domestically-owned firm. 
 
Differentiating the wage premium by skills, however, high-skilled workers should benefit 
most in the case when technology spillovers explain the wage premium. High-skilled workers 
have the largest absorptive capacity to learn new technologies, whereas less-skilled workers 
have little potential for learning and transferring technology, if any at all. 
 
Another type of model explains the foreign-firm wage premium by rent sharing of owners and 
employees in a bargaining game (Görg et al., 2007). Foreign-owned firms have firm-specific 
assets giving rise to a productivity advantage. Since the resulting rents are shared with the 
workers, the return to human capital is larger there than in domestically-owned firms. Hence, 
workers accumulate more human capital by on-the-job training over time in foreign-owned 
firms. 
 
In the model of Görg et al. (2007), the wage rise is restricted only to those workers taking part 
in the training on the job. But, more generally, rent sharing models explain wage premia of all 
types of workers, regardless of their skills, if they only have bargaining power.
4,5 Contrary to 
the technology spillover explanation, the wage premium should be largest among those 
                                                 
4 Empirical evidence for rent sharing within MNEs is provided by Budd et al. (2005). 
5 Of course, the wage premium may be an econometric artefact, as well. For example, it may rest on some sort of 
self-selection of workers along unobservable characteristics. An example of this type of explanation is the model 
in Mody et al. (2003). MNEs are assumed to have a superior technology in screening investment projects. Hence, 
they will end up acquiring the most productive indigenous firms. If productivity of domestic firms is based on 
unobservable worker characteristics, then MNEs appear to the econometrician as if they acquire firms that pay 
an inexplicable wage premium. Although not formally developed, efficiency wage theories such as Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984) suggest that some firms might pay higher wages than others to set work incentives in the presence 
of shirking. Presumably, MNEs are more likely to be the firms that play the high-wage strategy and attract the 
more productive workers.   7
workers which have the largest bargaining power. If anything, the bargaining power is largest 
among workers which are organized in trade unions. Those are typically not the high-skilled 
but the low- and medium-skilled workers. High-skilled workers fear to loose future promotion 
opportunities if they engage into strikes and other activities to increase their rent. 
 
Since we have data on foreign takeovers in Hungary, we consider them as a natural 
experiment: The further is the takeover event in the past the more time have workers had to 
experience the foreign technology. Hence, we study how the wage premium evolves over time 
from the takeover event onwards. The FDI technology spillover and the bargaining model 
have distinctive predictions on the wage-premium time-profile after the takeover of a 
domestic firm by a foreign investor when differentiated into highly educated and low or 
medium educated workers: 
 
Hypothesis A: Technology spillover model when knowledge absorption takes time. Right 
after a domestically-owned firm is acquired by a foreign investor, highly educated workers 
face an immediate wage decline that is followed up by a wage increase at a later time. The 
time pattern is weaker if existent at all for workers with medium or low education or skill 
(Malchow-Møller et al., 2006, and Urban, 2007). 
 
Hypothesis B: Bargaining model with learning. After a domestically-owned firm is acquired 
by its new foreign owner, a gradual built-up of a wage premium can be seen for the same 
(type of) low- and medium educated workers. The time pattern is weaker if existent at all for 
highly educated workers (Görg et al., 2007, and Budd et al., 2005). 
 
We will discriminate the two hypotheses by comparing the time profiles of the wage premium 
among workers with different education or skill levels. 
 
   8
3 Estimation methodology 
 
We investigate the wage premium of employees in firms that were domestically owned and 
have been acquired by foreign investors. We follow in the methodology both the pre-test 
technique of Heckman and Hotz (1989), applied to Hungarian privatizations by Brown et al. 
(2006a, 2006b), and a matching methodology such as in Girma and Görg (2007) and 
Csengödi et al. (2008). For this purpose, we employ two different samples of employee-
employer matched data on Hungary - the full sample and the matched sample the description 
of which is postponed to the following section. 
 
We estimate Mincer-wage regressions augmented by foreign ownership dummies including 
the following variables: 
 
ijt t t j j jt ijt jt ijt D d D d Firm Wor Ownerhip Wage ε β β β + ⋅ + ⋅ + + + = ' ker ' ' 3 2 1 . (1) 
 
The dependent variable is the log-employee-monthly gross wage of worker i in firm j at time 
t, Wageijt. As we focus on foreign takeovers rather than foreign-owned firms per se, and the 
variable of interest is the time profile of wage-differentials, we apply a set of foreign 
ownership dummy variables (Ownershipjt), one with value 1 in the year of the ownership 
change, another one with value 1 for observations when ownership change will occur later in 
the sample, and still others when an ownership change occurred 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more years, 
ago
6. To avoid large breaks in the composition of takeover firms, we require that they are at 
least for four subsequent time periods in the sample to be included in the takeover dummies. 
We also add ownership-change variables for foreign firms that become domestically owned 
and for foreign-owned firms without ownership change separated by the length of their stay in 
the sample. 
                                                 
6 Such a trajectory investigation was applied to firm-productivity changes of 4 former socialist countries 
including Hungary after privatization in Brown et al. (2006a) and Brown et al. (2006b).   9
 
Worker characteristics,  Workerijt, are gender, a 4
th order polynomial in total work 
experience, education and broad occupation categories. Firm characteristics, Firmjt, are firm 
size classes in terms of employment, average labor productivity and capital intensity. Details 
are given in the data section below. In addition, there are dummy variables, Dt and Dj, for 
industry, region, and year. Sometimes, we use also firm-fixed effects instead of industry-fixed 
effects, or a very detailed occupation-fixed effect vector instead of dummies for broad 
occupation classes. These control variables are identical to Csengödi et al. (2008). 
 
To discriminate hypothesis A from B, we split our samples by three education or alternatively 
by three broad occupation groups
7 and apply firm- and occupation-fixed effect estimators 
with firm-by-year clustered standard errors for each sub-sample, respectively. 
 
The three education categories are: 
•  Low education: workers with primary school or vocational training as highest degree; 
•  Medium education: workers with finished secondary school degree at highest; 
•  High education: workers with a college or university degree. 
 
Alternatively, the three broad occupation categories
8 are: 
•  Blue-collar workers: workers in jobs requiring basic physical skills or experience;  
•  White-collar low-skilled: workers employed in mainly administrative, routine based 
white-collar non-managerial positions; 
•  White-collar high-skilled: professionals with decision making competence except for 
strategic decision making (non-managerial position
9). 
                                                 
7 For a more detailed description of the education and broad occupation categories see Table 2 in the following 
data section. 
8 The three broad occupation categories are taken from Kertesi and Köllő (2001). 
9 We follow Csengödi et al. (2008) in excluding the top managers (employees with strategic decision making 
competence) from the analysis both if the sample is split by education groups, or by broad occupation groups.   10
  
A similar differentiation of the wage premium by skill or education group is undertaken by 
Heyman et al. (2006) for Sweden and Girma and Görg (2007) for the UK. 
 
 
4 Data description 
 
Since we apply our estimates both on the full sample and a matched sample, we first describe 
the full sample and then the matched one. 
 
4.1 The full sample 
 
We use data from the years 1992 to 2001 of Hungarian manufacturing firms and their 
employees based on the Hungarian Labor Office’s Structure of Earnings Survey (SES)
10,11. 
SES is a 5-6% sample of the total Hungarian registered workforce employed full time by 
companies with at least 20 full-time workers. Data collection occurs every year in May since 
1992 on a random basis.
12 If an employee is observed its employer is observed, too. While the 
SES is a representative sample of workers, it is not representative among firms, because small 
firms may drop out of the sample if none of its workers is drawn. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
The reason behind it is that many in that position might be foreigners, who were previously employed at the 
acquiring firm in the home country. Since those workers are not affected by technology spillovers through 
foreign acquisitions, theory requires excluding those foreign managers. As we can not unambiguously identify 
them in our sample, but find a very large standard deviation of wages in the occupation group of top 
management after foreign takeover, we exclude this group alltogether. 
10 The authors are grateful to the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for providing 
this dataset. 
11 A study of the foreign-firm wage premium on all sectors of Hungary is Earle and Telegdy (2007), which, 
however, does not analyze foreign takeovers. 
12 There are also data available for 1986 and 1989, but we do not apply them, because Hungary was not a market 
economy at this time.   11
The SES data contain information on employee-level about gender, education, age and 
occupation (classified by HSCO-93
13) in addition to the monthly gross earnings and other 
wage components. There are also firm-level information in the SES like the number of total 
employees in a firm, industry (2 digit NACE classification), location, and number of the 
firm’s blue- and white-collar workers. Merging employers’ profit and loss account data with 
the SES data using firm-identifiers, we obtain the called-up share of capital, the equity share 
of different types of owners (foreign, domestic private or state ownership), capital stock, 
income and cost structure information of employers, too.
14 Unfortunately, the data collection 
methodology of SES does not allow us to follow individuals across years, but we are able to 
follow firms across years. Hence, we construct a panel of (SES-sampled) firms. 
 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the monthly gross earnings of an employee. It 
includes the monthly gross wage, ordinary allowances (overtime or nightshift allowances) and 
1/12 part of the unordinary premium received in the previous year
15. 
 
The right-hand-side variables of our interest are the ones identifying ownership and the 
(future or past) change in ownership to capture the time profile of the foreign-wage premium. 
Following Heyman et al. (2007) and Csengödi et al. (2008), we consider a firm to be foreign 
owned if the share of foreign owners in the called up share of capital exceeds 50%. We 
choose this threshold of 50%, because our objective is to test technology spillover theories 
and a foreign-owned firm is only willing to transfer its cutting-edge technology to the foreign 
subsidiary if it has at least majority control over this plant.
16 
 
                                                 
13 The Hungarian Standard Classification of Occupations (HSCO 93) – a classification introduced by the Cental 
Statistical Office in Hungary in 1993 – differentiates between more than 600 occupation categories. 
14 Hardly any foreign takeovers of state-owned firms occured in our sample. Privatization of manufacturing 
occured by and large before our sample period. Brown et al. (2006b) report that about three quarters of all 
manufacturing firms were privatized by 1994. 
15 See Kertesi and Köllő (2001) for more details on the dependent variable. 
16 In addition, our results stay robust even when defining foreign ownership by a 10% ownership share of foreign 
capital. Results on this threshold are available from the authors upon request.   12
There are 3 types of foreign-owned firms in our dataset. A firm might enter the sample as 
domestically owned and turn its ownership into foreign in a latter year. These firms are called 
“foreign takeovers of domestic firms”
 17. A firm might enter as foreign owned, but its foreign 
participation rate drops below the foreign-ownership threshold in a subsequent year. These 
firms are called “domestic takeovers of foreign-owned firms”. A firm might enter the dataset 
as a foreign owned one and its foreign participation rate stays above the 50% threshold value 
throughout its sample life. We call them “unclassified firms”. 
 
Unfortunately, we cannot be sure whether the firms of the latter type are greenfield 
investments, although many of them probably are. Particularly, if a firm of the last type is 
small, it may not have been sampled before, although it existed. But then, this firm may have 
experienced an ownership change outside the sample and thus may be a foreign takeover. 
Moreover, we know for some years whether a worker was previously employed in a firm. We 
find frequently foreign-owned firms that enter our sample but employed already at least one 
worker in previous years. Hence, there may be additional takeovers among those firms that 
we observe as foreign-owned throughout their sample life. Vice versa, instead, we can be sure 
about all cases that we identify as foreign takeovers. 
 
In case of 7 firms (3856 observations), we identified multiple ownership changes. Following 
Görg and Girma (2007) and Heyman et al. (2007), we exclude them from the analysis.
18 The 
variable definitions are all summarized in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
17 Originally, the firm identifier changed if a completely new owner took over a company, but stayed the same if 
the foreign owner had previously a minority stake. However, Gábor Kőrösi (Institute of Economics of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences) figured out firm identifier changes that occured when existing plants changed 
ownership. We use this information for detecting takeovers. 
18 An unreported regression on a sample including observations of employees in firms with multiple ownership 
changes shows that this hardly affects our estimates.   13
Table 1: Data description 




Logarithm of monthly gross earnings including monthly 
gross basic wage as reported in the month May of each year, 
ordinary allowances (e.g. overtime or nightshift allowances) 
and 1/12
th of the annual unordinary premium received in the 






50% of called up equity share is held by foreign investors; 




Year of ownership 
change 
  
A firm is domestically owned on January 1 and foreign owned on 








 th, x={1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 or more years}, time lag of 








 th, x={1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 or more years}, time forward of 






from foreign to 
domestic 
  
The same set of dummy variables as above except for that 






Firms that enter the dataset as foreign-owned and stay foreign-
owned throughout sample life; primarily Greenfield investments 
but also unidentifiable foreign takeovers when takeover year is 







x=1: dummy with value 1 if employee has successfully attended 
vocational school as highest degree; x=2: Dummy with value 1 if 
employee holds as highest degree one from secondary school; 
x=3: Dummy with value one if employee attained successfully 








Age minus years spent in school minus common entry age into 














High-skilled workers not in managerial positions with HSCO-93 
code 1110-1134, 1211, 1212, 1221, 1311, 1312, 1342, 1346; 
professionals, workers with high education but without 








Employees with  HSCO-93 codes of 1001 – 4299 except white-
collar high-skilled workers; Office management: mainly 
administrative or routine based tasks which require 
secondary or technical school qualification. There is large 
work dependency and lack of individual decision making. 
  
SES   14
 




Occupations where knowledge and experience is necessary 
to operate machines or to drive vehicles; physical skills and 
experiences are needed related to material and non-material 
services; required is a knowledge of materials and tools used 
and instruments applied in the course of the working 

























 Firm size 
categories 
 
Dummy variables for the firm size classes with 21-50, 51-300,  







Each of 7 NUTS 2 regions of Hungary are divided up into country 
side, cities, and county capitals in addition to the region Budapest; 








NACE 2-digit code 
  
PLA 
Abbreviations: SES is “Structure of Earnings Survey” of the Hungarian Public Employment Service: a 6-7% 
sample of  Hungarian employees from 1992 until 2001 (we used only observations of employees employed by 
manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees); PLA is Profit and Loss Account Data of the Hungarian Tax 
and Financial Control Office: yearly balance-sheet and tax declaration information of  firms whose employees 




Our 10-year panel contains 346674 full-time employee observations of 7198 different firms 
all together. The number of the sampled firms increases from 2189 to 2925 over the years, the 
number of employee observations in a year from 30093 to 37473. This reflects both the 
growth of the Hungarian manufacturing sector as well as the increasing significance of inward 
FDI. Table 2 shows the decomposition of firm types within our sample in each year.  
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Table 2: Domestic and foreign-owned firms and number of ownership changes in the sample 


















1992 1950  239 28 8 205 
1993 2110  426 22 3 183 
1994 2197  513 31 9 114 
1995 1968  583 25 10 121 
1996 1821  613 25 21 73 
1997 1779  653 18 12 85 
1998 1817  681 12 25 81 
1999 1885  728 27 17 96 
2000 2076  843 26 20 139 
2001 2093  832 - - 100 
Total - - 214 125 - 
Source: SES database and own calculations. 
 
 
Firms stay on average 5.6 years out of the maximum of 10 in the sample. In our dataset, there 
are 214 foreign takeovers of domestic firms (6958 employee observations in the year of 
takeover), and 125 domestic takeovers of foreign-owned firms (2117 employee observations 
in the year of ownership change). Foreign takeovers are more or less evenly spread over the 
sample period and we do not expect any disturbances of our results from particular events or 
the sample window. 
 
 
4.2 The matched sample 
 
Constructing a matched control group based on the nearest neighbor matching method, we 
extract the treatment group, i.e. all firms one year before a foreign takeover, and the 
unmatched control group, i.e. the group of domestically-owned firms that are not taken over 
by foreign investors during their sample life. Then, we run a logit estimation on this firm 
sample where we estimate the probability that a firm is going to be taken over by foreign 
investors during the following year:    16
] 0 [ 1 , '
*
1 , 1 ,
*
1 , > = + + + = + + + t j t j jt k t jt t j Takeover Takeover D D z Takeover υ γ . (2) 
 
Takeoverjt is a dummy variable with value one if firm j is taken over by a foreign investor in 
year t, and zero otherwise. The selection variables, zjt, in the baseline logit equation are log-
employment, log-average labor productivity, log-capital intensity, the export share, the export 
share interacted with log-employment in addition to industry-, and year dummies, Dk and Dt, 
respectively.
19 The estimates of the takeover probability from specification (2) are reported in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Logit estimates of propensity score 
Dependent variable: 





 (1)  (2) 
 
Log average labor 






































     
      
Pseudo R
2 0.09  0.09 
Observations  14 827  14 827 
Notes: t-values are in parenthesis. *** denotes 99% significance level, ** 95%, 
90%; Industry and year dummies included. 
 
Next, we create a matched control group by nearest-neighbor matching with replacement such 
that we match to each firm in the treatment group the firm from the unmatched control group 
                                                 
19 These are similar to the ones used by Heyman et al. (2007) and Görg and Girma (2007) and identical to the 
ones used in Csengödi et al. (2008).   17
with the closest probability of being taken over. When several nearest neighbors exist, we 
include all of them, adjusting the matching weights accordingly. If a firm from the control 
group is several times a nearest neighbor, then matching weights are also adjusted 
accordingly.
 20 Each employee observation obtains the sum of all matching weights of the 
firm to which a worker belongs at a time. 
 
Table 4: Balancing test 















Log average labor 



































































































               
Notes: Balancing of industry and year dummies is not reported; All dummies have a percent bias below 20. 
Mean-diff. is mean-difference test with standard deviations differing between treatment and control group; All 
unreported mean-difference tests on industry- and year dummies are insignificant. 
 
Matching estimators are biased unless the conditional independence assumption holds, i.e. the 
outcome in the treatment and the no-treatment case are independent of unobservable 
characteristics of the participation decision. Under this assumption the selection variables are 
                                                 
20 Formally, we construct the matching weights as follows. First, define the estimated propensity scores 
i p ˆ  of the 
treatment group and 






⎧ − = j i
j
i p p C ˆ ˆ inf arg for each observation in the treatment group T,  T i∈ . Thereafter, denote the number of 
observations in the set Ci by 









] [ 1  for all 
observations j in the control group,  NT j∈ ,   1 = j weight  for all observations in the treatment group,  T j∈ , and 
0 = j weight , otherwise.   18
balanced between the treatment and matched-control group (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
Lack of balancing points at violation of the conditional independence assumption or other 
misspecifications of the propensity score estimates. We employ three different balancing tests. 
The first one is the standardized difference between treatment and matched-control group of 
all selection variables each at a time (see, e.g., Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Although there 
is no significance level on this statistic available, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) call the 
standardized difference large if it exceeds 20%. The second test is a mean-difference t-test 
with standard deviations differing in treatment and matched-control group. These two tests are 
reported in Table 4 and balancing cannot be rejected. 
 
A third test is the one of Hotelling that checks balancing within each quintile over all 
variables jointly. Again, balancing cannot be rejected according to the test results in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Hotelling’s T-squared test by propensity score quintile 
Quintile T-squared  statistics F-test  statistics p-value









Fourth 24.72 0.68 0.79
Fifth 32.32 1.08 0.43
 
 
Overall, the balancing tests ensure that our matched sample does not violate the conditional 





We first investigate in the following subsection the time profile of the wage premium after 
foreign takeovers on the full sample. Thereafter, we apply the same analysis to the matched 
sample. 
   19
5.1 Results on the full sample 
 
First, we estimate wage regressions on the three subsamples of employees with low-
education, medium-education and high-education, respectively. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 6 
present the results of wage regressions with occupation-fixed effects
21 while columns (4)-(6) 
contain firm-fixed effect regression results. 
 
One dummy called “before ownership change” takes value one if an employee observation 
belongs to a firm that will be taken over by foreign investors at a later year in the sample.
 22 
Another dummy – called “year of ownership change” – marks all employees in firms that 
experience an ownership change from domestic to foreign. Dummies called “one-, two-, 
three-, and four or more years after takeover” indicate observations of previously domestically 
owned firms (and their employees) that were taken over by foreign investors one-, two, three, 
and four or more years ago. 
 
Regardless of the education group of workers or type of fixed effect, we face more or less the 
same pattern of wage-evolution. Before firms are taken over by foreigners, their wages are not 
significantly different from other domestically-owned firms (indicated with the letter A in 
Table 6). In the year of takeover (indicated with B), a significant wage hike shows up and 
disappears right after the year of the takeover (indicated with C). In the years after foreign 
takeover, there is a gradual build-up of a wage premium that turns to be significantly higher 4 
or more years after takeover (indicated with D) than the wage level that the same type of 
workers earns in domestically-owned firms. A formal Wald test indicates that the wage 
premium is significantly larger 4 or more years after foreign takeover (D) compared to the 
                                                 
21 The occupation code HSCO 93 is not available during the years 1992 and 1993 and observations over these 
two years are thus left out of the analysis when applying occupation fixed effects.  
22 The dummy variable „before ownership change” relates only to one year before takeover in all firm-fixed 
effect specifications to avoid a dummy variable trap. In all other cases, it relates to all observations of employees 
in firms before being taken over by foreign investors.   20
 first year after foreign takeover (C) regardless of the education group. 
 












































































































































































           













           
















2  0.52  0.51 0.54  0.63  0.59 0.60 
Observations  166 438  78 027  24777  208 029  97 477  31 108 
Notes: clustered t-values are in parenthesis. *** denotes 99% significance level, ** 95%, * 90%. Occup.FE controls for 539 occupation 
dummies. Wald-test on parameter constraints: Probability of insignificance of Ho in parenthesis. Additional control variables include firm 
size categories, year dummies, 2-digit industry dummies and region dummies, EDUCATION1, EDUCATION2, EDUCATION3, 
EDUCATION4, EXPERIENCE1, EXPERIENCE2, EXPERIENCE3, EXPERIENCE4, white-collar managerial and non-managerial, male, 
log average labor productivity of firm, log capital intensity. Dummy variables for unclassified firms and for domestic takeovers of foreign 
owned firms are always included.   21
Hence, we cannot discriminate our two hypotheses from this estimate alone. 
 
Takeover target firms might have unobservable characteristics that bias wages upward. 
However, the same characteristics may render these firms attractive to foreign investors (self-
selection effect). In this case, we would find wage premia of takeover firms in our estimates, 
although there is no causal effect from the takeover on wages itself. In order to check for this 
self-selection effect, one can apply the preprogram test of Heckman and Hotz (1989), 
examining whether the coefficient on the “before ownership change” dummy is significantly 
different from zero. For if it is significantly positive, takeover firms have paid already higher 
wages before takeover, indicating the existence of such unobservable characteristics. 




The significant wage hike in the year of foreign acquisition can be considered as a 
restructuring that takes place immediately after takeover. It is well described by a substantial 
change in the workforce: labor productivity rises immediately, as well, presumably because 
the unproductive workforce is laid off; parallel to the reduction of the overall workforce a 
significant increase can be observed in the share of new workers (from 9% to 24%) in the year 
of takeover, while the share of workers with college or university degree rises from 10% 
before to 17% after the acquisition; If there is rent sharing, the profit increase resulting form 
the cut in employment will be shared with the remaining workers. Productivity of the workers 
might fall temporarily – and so do their wages – right after the restructuring took place 
because new technologies and processes are put then into practice and have to be learnt first. 
When new processes have become established, resulting productivity gains materialize fully 
                                                 
23 We also checked in unreported regressions by means of an appropriate Wald test that the observations before 
takeover can be pooled together regardless of whether there are one-, two-, three-, or four and more years before 
takeover. Hence, we do not have any signs that rents are shifted to the old workforce before the takeover takes 
place (asset stripping). See Aghion et al. (1994) for managerial incentives to support or delay company 
restructuring and to engage into actions that shift ressources from the company into private pockets.   22
and wages rise again accordingly through rent sharing.
24 More details on explaining this wage 
hike is given in Csengödi et al. (2008) and will not be considered further in this study, since it 
does not help discriminating the two hypotheses on technology spillovers and wage 
bargaining. 
 
In Table 7 we report both occupation- and firm-fixed effect estimation results of wage 
regressions when splitting the sample along the three broad occupation groups: blue collar 
workers, white-collar low-skilled workers, and white-collar high-skilled workers. 
Astonishingly, the gradually built-up long-run wage premium observed 4 years or more after 
the ownership has changed from domestic to foreign, exists only in the case of blue-collar and 
low-skilled white-collar workers. Instead, high-skilled white-collar workers do not experience 
a rise in the wage premium during the years after takeover according to a Wald test that 
compares the wage premium one year after ownership change (C) with the one 4 or more 
years after ownership change (D). This holds irrespective of whether applying occupation- or 
firm-fixed effect estimations. Hence, we have a first indication that hypothesis B rather than 
hypothesis A holds, favoring the bargaining model over the technology spillover model. To 
obtain, however, the causal effect of the foreign takeover on the wage premium, we need to 
apply matching techniques. 
 
5.2 Results on the matched sample 
 
In this subsection, we redo the estimates of Tables 6 and 7 on the matched sample. To 
incorporate the fact into the estimates that sometimes several identical nearest neighbors exist 
or one control group observation serves as nearest neighbor for several treatment 
observations, we use the matching weights as weights in all the following regressions. 
                                                 
24 Brown et al. (2006b) reports gradual productivity gains after Hungarian privatization to foreign investors. We 
have found similar gradual productivity gains of foreign takeovers in unreported production function estimations 
on our sample.   23




















































































































































































           













           















           
R
2  0.53  0.60  0.42 0.65 0.65  0.81 
Observations  191 952  77 220  6225  237 560 98 635  7 255 
Notes: clustered t-values are in parenthesis. *** denotes 99% significance level, ** 95%, * 90%. Occup.FE controls for 539 occupation 
dummies. Wald-test on parameter constraints: Probability of insignificance of Ho in parenthesis. Additional control variables include firm 
size categories, year dummies, 2-digit industry dummies and region dummies, EDUCATION1, EDUCATION2, EDUCATION3, 
EDUCATION4, EXPERIENCE1, EXPERIENCE2, EXPERIENCE3, EXPERIENCE4, white collar managerial and non-managerial, male, 
log average labor productivity of firm, log capital intensity. Dummy variables for unclassified firms and for domestic takeovers of foreign 
owned firms are always included. 
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Occupation-fixed effect estimations by education group (specification (1)-(3) in Table 8) 
show results that are different from the ones obtained on the full sample. Now, there is no 
longer a gradual increase in the wage premium of workers with a high level of education 
when comparing the wage premium in the first year after takeover (C) with the wage premium 
4 or more years after takeover (D). Still, the previously observed gradual built-up of a 
significant long-term wage premium of low- and medium educated workers is conserved on 
the matched sample. Hence, we have evidence for rejecting hypothesis A in favor of 
hypothesis B. According to hypothesis B, there is a productivity increase of a firm after a 
foreign takeover. Those workers who are organized in trade unions, i.e. the workers with a 
low or a medium education level, obtain a share of the resulting rents through larger wages. 
Were technology spillover effects the reason for the wage increase, then workers with high 
levels of education would have benefited the most, instead. 
 
The result that there is a gradual increase of the wage premium after takeover for workers 
with low and medium education levels, but not for workers with high education levels is also 
robust to including either occupation or firm fixed effects into the wage regressions 
(specifications (4)-(6) in Table 8). Moreover, when using broad occupation groups instead of 
education groups in Table 9, the gradual increase of the wage premium is found for blue 
collar- and low-skilled white-collar workers, but not for high-skilled white-collar workers. 
 
A small caveat applies to the estimates of column (2) in Table 8, because wages of the 
medium educated workers seem to be significantly lower in takeover target firms compared to 
their control group before takeover. However, this effect disappears in column (5) when 
applying firm fixed effects. 
   25



























































































































































           












           















           
R
2  0.60  0.61 0.61  0.60  0.52 0.46 
Observations  20 057  14 396  5 418  24 626  17 753  6 498 
Notes: clustered t-values are in parenthesis. *** denotes 99% significance level, ** 95%, * 90%. Occup.FE controls for 539 occupation 
dummies. Wald-test on parameter constraints: Probability of insignificance of Ho in parenthesis. Additional control variables include firm 
size categories, year dummies, 2-digit industry dummies and region dummies, EDUCATION1, EDUCATION2, EDUCATION3, 
EDUCATION4, EXPERIENCE1, EXPERIENCE2, EXPERIENCE3, EXPERIENCE4, white collar managerial and non-managerial, male, 
log average labor productivity of firm, log capital intensity. Dummy variables for unclassified firms and for domestic takeovers of foreign 
owned firms are always included.   26






























































































































































           












           















           
R
2  0.61  0.71 0.56  0.61  0.63 0.71 
Observations  25 576  14 295  698  25 576  14 295  698 
Notes: clustered t-values are in parenthesis. *** denotes 99% significance level, ** 95%, * 90%. Occup.FE controls for 539 occupation 
dummies. Wald-test on parameter constraints: Probability of insignificance of Ho in parenthesis. Additional control variables include firm 
size categories, year dummies, 2-digit industry dummies and region dummies, EDUCATION1, EDUCATION2, EDUCATION3, 
EDUCATION4, EXPERIENCE1, EXPERIENCE2, EXPERIENCE3, EXPERIENCE4, white collar managerial and non-managerial, male, 
log average labor productivity of firm, log capital intensity. Dummy variables for unclassified firms and for domestic takeovers of foreign 
owned firms are always included. 
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According to Dehejia (2005), our results based on the matched sample can be considered 
robust if a slight change in the logit selection equation does not affect our results. So we 
constructed another matched sample based on propensity scores that were estimated with a 
slightly modified logit estimation in order to carry out the robustness check. As one can see in 
the table of Appendix 1, there is still a gradual built-up of the wage premium of low- and 
medium educated workers of firms that have been taken over by foreign investors, regardless 
of applying occupation- or firm-fixed effect estimators. Again, both with occupation- or firm-
fixed effects, the wage premium increases during the years after takeover, supporting the 
bargaining model and rejecting the technology spillover model. 
 
A final test rejecting the technology spillover model investigates the initial drop in wages 
after takeover by comparing the wage before takeover (A) with the wage in the first year after 
takeover (C). Whenever a Wald test rejects equality of these two coefficients in one of the 
specifications reported in the Tables 6-9, the wage one year after takeover is larger, not 
smaller than the wage before takeover. Hence, there is no wage drop immediately after 






We have tested an FDI technology spillover model against a wage bargaining model on an 
employee-employer matched dataset from Hungary over the last decade by investigating the 
wage premium profile before and after a foreign takeover differentiated by education or broad 
occupation group. An FDI technology spillover model predicts that wages drop right after a 
foreign takeover and rise above the previous level for all workers that increase their 
productivity through on the job-learning. Hence, such a wage pattern should be more likely to   28
be observed the higher is the qualification of a worker, since the technology absorption 
capacity rises with the level of qualification. The alternative bargaining model predicts, 
instead, that wages rise parallel to the improvement of the productivity of the acquired firm. 
In contrast to the spillover model, a wage rise in the course of a foreign takeover is expected 
among those workers who are organized in trade unions. Those are, however, usually the less-
qualified workers. 
 
When investigating the time profile of the foreign-firm wage premium before and after a 
takeover, we find a rise in the wage premium 4 and more years after takeover compared to 
one year after takeover for workers with low- and medium levels of education and for blue-
collar and white-collar low-skilled workers. However, we do not find a significant wage rise 
among either workers with a high level of education or among white-collar high-skilled 
workers. Moreover, there is no initial wage drop after takeover. Hence, we reject the 
technology spillover model in favor of a wage bargaining model. 
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2  0.67  0.62 0.63  0.64  0.51 0.47 
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Notes: clustered t-values are in parenthesis. *** denotes 99% significance level, ** 95%, * 90%. Occup.FE controls for 539 occupation 
dummies. Wald-test on parameter constraints: Probability of insignificance of Ho in parenthesis. Additional control variables include firm 
size categories, year dummies, 2-digit industry dummies and region dummies, EDUCATION1, EDUCATION2, EDUCATION3, 
EDUCATION4, EXPERIENCE1, EXPERIENCE2, EXPERIENCE3, EXPERIENCE4, white collar managerial and non-managerial, male, 
log average labor productivity of firm, log capital intensity. Dummy variables for unclassified firms and for domestic takeovers of foreign 
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